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RIGGINS v. NEVADA:
THE ACCUSED'S RIGHT TO "JUST SAY NO"
TO ANTIPSYCHOTIC DRUGS?
The use of antipsychotic drugs to alter psychotic behavior has vastly
improved the quality of life for many mentally ill patients.' While anti-
psychotic drugs do not cure psychosis, they can reduce its more acute
symptoms, such as thought disorder, indifference, paranoid identification,
hallucinations, belligerence, bizarre behavior, and inappropriate re-
sponses to people.2
Antipsychotic drugs are powerful agents that are administered to alter
the chemical balances in the brain,3 but that may, like many medical
treatments, produce unwanted side effects.4 Both the detrimental side
effects and the intrusive nature of antipsychotic drugs are significant fac-
tors when a state wants to forcibly treat an individual with these agents.5
Many American courts have considered whether persons confined to
1. JOHN M. DAVIS & JONATHAN 0. COLE, Antipsychotic Drugs, in 5 AMERICAN
HANDBOOK OF PSYCHIATRY 441, 441-42 (Daniel X. Freedman & Jarl E. Dyrud eds., 2d ed.
1975). Psychiatric practice has been profoundly affected by the discovery of antipsychotic
drugs and their antischizophrenic effects. Id. at 441. Beyond the pharmacological actions
of these drugs, their discovery allowed public mental institutions for the first time to be
regarded as "true treatment centers, rather than as primarily custodial facilities." Id. at
442. Furthermore, because the drugs are capable of bringing the more disruptive and de-
structive psychotic behaviors under control, their use also made possible the widespread
use of other therapies, such as psychotherapy, group therapy, and occupational therapy.
Id. Antipsychotic drug therapy has resulted in a major reduction in the number of hospi-
talized schizophrenic patients. Id.
2. Id. at 446; see also PHYSICIANS' DESK REFERENCE 1940 (44th ed. 1990) (describing
the clinical pharmacology and indications for the antipsychotic drug Mellaril).
3. Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 229 (1990); see also Brief Amicus Curiae of
the American Psychiatric Association Supporting Petitioner at 7-8, Riggins v. Nevada, 112
S. Ct. 1810 (1992) (No. 90-8466) [hereinafter Brief of the American Psychiatric Associa-
tion] (stating antipsychotic drugs are used to treat serious disorders of the mind where
reality cannot be distinguished from fantasy, as compared with antidepressants which are
used to treat mood disorders).
4. See PHYSICIANS' DESK REFERENCE, supra note 2, at 1940-41 (describing serious
adverse reactions, such as tardive dyskinesia, to the antipsychotic drug Mellaril).
5. See Riggins v. Nevada, 112 S. Ct. 1810, 1814 (1992) (recognizing the intrusive na-
ture of antipsychotic drugs and their side effects in concluding that the forcible injection of
medication represents a substantial interference with the person's liberty, and, in the case
of antipsychotic drugs, that interference is "particularly severe"); Harper, 494 U.S. at 229-
30 (recognizing intrusive nature of antipsychotic drugs and their side effects in concluding
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mental institutions or prisons have a constitutional right to refuse treat-
ment with antipsychotic drugs.6 While the United States Supreme Court
has recognized a liberty interest in being free from unwanted anti-
psychotic drugs, the Court has further concluded that such an interest is
not absolute and must be weighed against competing state interests.7
In Riggins v. Nevada,8 the United States Supreme Court considered
whether the forced administration of antipsychotic medication during
trial violated the defendant's Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights.9
In a seven to two decision, the Court concluded that the lower courts'
failure to acknowledge Riggins' liberty interest in freedom from contin-
ual, involuntary antipsychotic drug treatment without any determination
regarding the need for antipsychotic medication or any consideration of
reasonable alternatives constituted reversible error.10 The Court stated
that such error may have violated Riggins' right to a full and fair trial."
The Court reasoned that Riggins' rights at trial possibly were impaired
because the side effects of the medication may have impacted his outward
appearance, the content of his testimony, his ability to follow the pro-
ceedings, or the substance of his communication with counsel.' 2
that the "[r]espondent's interest in avoiding the unwarranted administration of antip-
sychotic drugs is not insubstantial").
6. See Harper, 494 U.S. at 229-30 (prison inmate challenging forced antipsychotic
medication); see also Bee v. Greaves, 744 F.2d 1387 (10th Cir. 1984) (pretrial detainee
challenging forced antipsychotic medication), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1214 (1985); Rogers v.
Okin, 738 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1984) (mental hospital patients challenging forced antipsychotic
medication); United States v. Bryant, 670 F. Supp. 840 (D. Minn. 1987) (prison inmate
challenging forced antipsychotic medication); see generally Michele K. Bachand, Antip-
sychotic Drugs and the Incompetent Defendant: A Perspective on the Treatment and Prose-
cution, of Incompetent Defendants, 47 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1059 (1990) (discussing
whether a state may treat a defendant with antipsychotic drugs without consent, and
whether a state may bring a medicated defendant to trial).
7. Harper, 494 U.S. at 227 (holding that due process allows a mentally ill inmate to be
treated with antipsychotic drugs where the inmate is dangerous to himself or others and
the treatment is medically appropriate).
8. 112 S. Ct. 1810 (1992).
9. Id. at 1814.
10. Id. at 1815-16.
11. Id. at 1816.
12. Id.; see also In re Pray, 336 A.2d 174 (Vt. 1975) (holding that where a defendant's
defense to a first degree murder charge was solely based on a plea of insanity, the state
should have at least informed the jury that defendant was under heavy sedation); State v.
Murphy, 355 P.2d 323 (Wash. 1960) (en banc) (granting a new trial upon a showing by the
accused of a reasonable possibility that his attitude, appearance, and demeanor may have
been influenced by tranquilizers administered during trial where the jury imposed the
death penalty). But see State v. Hayes, 389 A.2d 1379 (N.H. 1978) (holding defendant has
no absolute right to be tried free from the influence of the drugs where defendant was
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This Note first discusses the side effects that accompany antipsychotic
drug treatment and examines how courts have addressed the asserted
right to refuse treatment with antipsychotic drugs in the pre-trial and
prison settings. Part II analyzes the Supreme Court's holding in Riggins
v. Nevada. Finally, this Note examines the implications of Riggins with
respect to a state's burden to justify the need to medicate a defendant
with antipsychotic medication before or during trial.
I. ANTIPSYCHOTIC DRUGS
Physicians widely prescribe antipsychotic drugs for patients exhibiting
symptoms of psychosis, and the therapeutic benefits of these drugs are
well documented.13 Antipsychotic drugs are used to alter the chemical
balance in the brain to effect positive changes in the patient's ability to
organize his or her thought processes.' 4 Antipsychotic drugs can elimi-
nate hallucinations and delusions, thereby restoring the patient to a ra-
tional state of mind.' In fact, for many patients there is no alternative
effective treatment of psychotic illness. 6
under the influence of the drugs at the time of the crime); State v. Jojola, 553 P.2d 1296
(N.M. Ct. App. 1976) (holding that the defendant does not have an absolute right to be
tried free from the influence of antipsychotic drugs and due process is not denied by trying
him under the influence of drugs administered to sedate him emotionally); State v. Law,
244 S.E.2d 302 (S.C. 1978) (holding defendant's insanity defense and his ability to assist
counsel and confront witnesses against him were not undermined by the fact that defend-
ant was forcibly medicated during trial).
13. See Brief of the American Psychiatric Association, supra note 3, at 8 (stating antip-
sychotic drugs are widely accepted within the psychiatric community as a highly effective
treatment, and are the treatment of choice by many); see generally Davis & Cole, supra
note 1, at 441-59 (discussing effective treatment with antipsychotic drugs).
14. Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 229 (1990). Harper received antipsychotic
medication after first being diagnosed with a manic-depressive disorder. Id. at 214. Later,
he was diagnosed as suffering from schizophrenia. Id. at 214 n.2; see also Brief of the
American Psychiatric Association, supra note 3, at 8 (discussing the effective treatment of
schizophrenia with antipsychotic drugs).
15. See AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC PRESS TEXTBOOK OF PSYCHIATRY 774 (John A. Tal-
bott et al. eds., 1988); see also Davis & Cole, supra note 1, at 442 (stating that antipsychotic
medication so improved some mentally ill patients that they were discharged from the
hospital and returned to their communities to be functioning members, and stating that
schizophrenic patients can often be effectively treated with antipsychotic drugs without
ever being hospitalized).
16. See Brief of the American Psychiatric Association, supra note 3, at 4 (contending
that antipsychotic medication "may be the only reasonable means of treating a defendant
in custody who is mentally ill and dangerous to himself... [and] may be the only reason-
able means of restoring or maintaining a defendant's competence to stand trial").
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A. The Side Effects of Antipsychotic Drugs
If you take a lot of [the antipsychotic drug Mellaril] you become
stoned for all practical purposes and can barely function. 7
Despite the potential of antipsychotic drugs to alleviate the symptoms
of psychosis, they are dangerous and even fatal for some patients. 18 The
negative side effects of antipsychotic drugs are wide ranging and vary in
severity. Physical or motor activity impairments include akinesia, akathi-
sia, parkinsonian syndrome, and tardive dyskinesia. 9 Akinesia is charac-
terized by lethargy, drooling, apathy, and rigid facial expressions.20
Akathisia is a condition of semi-involuntary motor restlessness 21 wherein
patients often cannot sit still and may experience anxiety attacks.22
Symptoms of parkinsonian syndrome are similar to those associated with
Parkinson's disease, such as muscle tremors, masklike facial expressions,
the slowing of voluntary movements, and rigidity.23 Tardive dyskinesia
(TD), a neurological disorder with physical manifestations, may occur
late in the course of antipsychotic drug treatment, particularly where high
doses have been administered for several years.24 Symptoms of TD in-
clude uncontrollable muscular movements, particularly around the
mouth, such as smacking of the lips, involuntary sucking, lateral or "fly
catching" movements of the tongue, and grimacing.25 The symptoms of
17. Riggins v. Nevada, 112 S. Ct. 1810, 1819 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (quoting
Dr. Jurasky, one of three court appointed psychiatrists who examined Riggins to determine
his competency to stand trial). But see Brief of the American Psychiatric Association,
supra note 3, at 11 (stating "[t]here is, however, little reliable evidence that properly used
antipsychotic medication has any significant adverse effect on attention or perception").
See generally Davis & Cole, supra note 1, at 449-52 (discussing dosages of antipsychotic
medication). Because different patients respond to different dosages, there is no set dose
for any given antipsychotic drug. Id. at 449. "There is a wide therapeutic range between
effective dose and toxic overdose with the antipsychotic agents." Id. at 450.
18. See PHYSICIANS' DESK REFERENCE, supra note 2, at 1941 (discussing adverse reac-
tions associated with the antipsychotic drug Mellaril); Harper, 494 U.S. at 230 (describing
one side effect, neuroleptic malignant syndrome as "a relatively rare condition which can
lead to death from cardiac dysfunction").
19. See Davis & Cole, supra note 1, at 460-63 (discussing akathisia, parkinsonian syn-
drome, and tardive dyskinesia); Bachand, supra note 6, at 1061-62 (discussing akinesia,
akathisia, and tardive dyskinesia).
20. Bachand, supra note 6, at 1061-62.
21. Id. at 1062 (stating akathisia causes "a pronounced inner restlessness or
jumpiness").
22. Davis & Cole, supra note 1, at 460-61.
23. Id. at 460.
24. Id. at 462.
25. Id. Antiparkinsonian medication is not effective to treat tardive dyskinesia. Id. at
463.
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TD have been observed not only during full treatment, but also several
days or weeks after treatment has ceased or been reduced.26
Autonomic, physical side effects of antipsychotic drugs include dry
mouth and throat, blurred vision, flushed skin, constipation, and urinary
retention.27 Long term eye and skin disorders have also been observed,
including a discoloration of skin exposed to sunlight, wherein the skin
first turns tan and then to a dark gray, blue, or purple color.2' Retinitis
pigmentosa may develop when dosages of thioridazine (Mellaril) exceed
800 milligrams per day. 29 Effects on the endocrine system include breast
engorgement, lactation, and male impotence.
30
Antipsychotic drugs may also cause behavioral side effects, such as
toxic confusion, insomnia, bizarre dreams, and aggravated schizophrenic
symptoms. 31 The American Psychiatric Association has recognized that
the drugs' sedation-like effect can alter the thought processes in severe
cases.
32
B. The Right to Refuse Antipsychotic Medication
In Bee v. Greaves,33 the Tenth Circuit held that a pretrial detainee
26. Id. at 462. There is some disagreement over the frequency, severity, treatment and
permanence of tardive dyskinesia. Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 230 (1990). The
American Psychiatric Association asserts that tardive dyskinesia "occurs only in a distinct
minority of patients ... is not generally progressive even when the antipsychotics are con-
tinued after the condition develops ... and often abate[s] at some time after medication is
reduced or stopped." Brief of the American Psychiatric Association, supra note 3, at 10
n.5 (citations omitted). The American Psychological Association, however, pointed out in
its brief as amicus curiae in Washington v. Harper, that the observation of tardive dyskine-
sia has been increasing "'at an alarming rate"' and that "'the chance of suffering this po-
tentially devastating disorder is greater than one in four."' Harper, 494 U.S. at 239 n.5
(Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citations omitted).
27. Davis & Cole, supra note 1, at 459. Other autonomic side effects include paralytic
ileus, mental confusion, miosis, mydriasis, and postural hypotension. Id.
28. Id. at 465.
29. Id. Mellaril is the trade name for the antipsychotic drug thioridazine. PHYSICIANS'
DESK REFERENCE, supra note 2, at 1940. Serious visual impairment or even blindness may
result, and thus the authors caution that "one must strictly avoid thioridazine doses exceed-
ing 800 [milligrams per] day." Davis & Cole, supra note 1, at 465. Defendant Riggins was
receiving 800 milligrams per day at the time of his trial. Riggins v. Nevada, 112 S. Ct. 1810,
1813 (1992).
30. Davis & Cole, supra note 1, at 465. Thioridazine (Mellaril) produces the greatest
incidence of sexual impotence in male patients among all antipsychotic drugs. Id.
31. Id. at 463.
32. Brief of the American Psychiatric Association, supra note 3, at 10-11. However,
amici assert that when properly prescribed there is little evidence that antipsychotic medi-
cation has a significant adverse effect on attention or perception. Id. at 11.
33. 744 F.2d 1387 (10th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1214 (1985).
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treated with antipsychotic drugs against his will has a constitutionally pro-
tected liberty interest in refusing the unwanted medication.34 The Tenth
Circuit considered three constitutional bases for its holding.35
First, the court recognized a liberty interest based on the constitution-
ally protected fundamental right to privacy.36 The court concluded that
34. Bee, 744 F.2d at 1391-92. Daniel Howard Bee filed this action under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 (1976) against state officials in federal district court to challenge the forced antip-
sychotic medication while he was jailed prior to trial. Id. at 1389. Bee asserted that medi-
cating him with antipsychotics against his will violated his constitutional due process and
privacy rights. Id. at 1391. Defendants asserted that pretrial detainees have no constitu-
tional right to refuse medical treatment while incarcerated. The district court granted the
defendants' motion for summary judgment. Id.
35. Id. at 1391-92.
36. Id. at 1392-93; accord Rogers v. Okin, 634 F.2d 650 (1st Cir. 1980), vacated and
remanded on other grounds sub nom., Mills v. Rogers, 457 U.S. 291 (1982), on remand 738
F.2d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 1984) (holding that state procedural rules regarding forcible antip-
sychotic medication of mental patients create federally protected liberty interests under the
Due Process Clause). In Rogers, a class action suit was filed by mental hospital patients
against members of the hospital staff, seeking injunctive and monetary relief from the de-
fendants' forcible medication practices. The district court granted plaintiffs injunctive re-
lief but denied their claims for damages under federal and state law. Rogers v. Okin, 478
F.Supp. 1342, 1383 (D. Mass. 1979). Defendants appealed the district court's order en-
joining the forcible use of antipsychotic medication, and plaintiffs cross appealed from the
denial of damages. The First Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part the district
court's injunctive order. Rogers, 634 F.2d at 650. In April 1981, the Supreme Court
granted certiorari to decide whether an involuntarily committed mental patient has a con-
stitutional right to refuse treatment with antipsychotic drugs. Okin v. Rogers, 451 U.S. 906
(1981). With certiorari pending, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court issued its opin-
ion in In re Guardianship of Roe, 421 N.E.2d 40, 42 (Mass. 1981), in which the court held
that a noninstitutionalized, mentally incompetent ward had a protected liberty interest in
refusing treatment with antipsychotic drugs grounded in common law and federal constitu-
tional law. In light of Roe, the United States Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the
First Circuit in Rogers and remanded for a determination of whether state law had been
modified by Roe and whether the rights and duties of the parties could be determined
entirely under state law. Mills v. Rogers, 457 U.S. 291, 306 (1982). The Supreme Court
stated that an involuntarily committed mental patient's right to refuse medication has both
substantive and procedural aspects, and that state law can go further than the federal Con-
stitution in creating substantive liberty interests and in creating procedural protections for
those interests. Id. at 300. The First Circuit thereafter certified nine questions to the Mas-
sachusetts Supreme Court to clarify the nature and extent of a patient's substantive and
procedural rights under Massachusetts law. Rogers v. Commission of the Dep't of Mental
Health, 458 N.E.2d 308. 312 (Mass. 1983); see also Youngberg v. Romeo. 644 F.2d 147 (3d
Cir. 1980) (en banc), vacated. 457 U.S. 307, 316 (1982) (holding an involuntarily committed
mentally ill patient has a constitutionally protected liberty interest under the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to freedom from unreasonable bodily restraints);
Rennie v. Klein, 476 F.Supp. 1294 (D.N.J. 1979), modified, 653 F.2d 836 (3rd Cir. 1981) (en
banc), vacated, 458 U.S. 1119 (1982), on remand 720 F.2d 266, 269 (3d Cir. 1983) (en banc)
(holding an involuntarily committed mentally ill patient has a constitutionally protected
right to refuse antipsychotic medication). Rennie was remanded by the Supreme Court at
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the personal decision to accept or reject potentially dangerous antip-
sychotic drugs falls within the constitutionally protected right to privacy,
and the forced administration of these drugs constitutes a significant inva-
sion of that right.37
Second, the Bee court likened Bee's interest in being free from the un-
wanted physical and mental restraints potentially imposed by antip-
sychotic drugs to freedom from physical, bodily restraints.3' The court
reasoned that because incarcerated individuals retain a liberty interest in
freedom from soft physical restraints, they also should enjoy a liberty in-
terest in being free from the physical and mental restraints caused by
antipsychotic drugs.39 The Bee court relied on Vitek v. Jones,' wherein
the Supreme Court held that "[c]ompelled treatment in the form of
mandatory behavior modification programs is a proper factor to be con-
sidered in determining whether a prisoner's liberty interest in personal
security has been infringed."'"
Finally, the Bee court grounded the asserted liberty interest in the First
Amendment right to the free communication of ideas.42 The court rea-
soned that "fa]ntipsychotic drugs have the capacity to severely and even
the same time as Rogers v. Okin, specifically for reconsideration. in light of the Court's
opinion in Youngberg v. Romeo.
37. Bee, 744 F.2d at 1392-93 (relying on Davis v. Hubbard, 506 F. Supp. 915 (N.D.
Ohio 1980)). The Hubbard court stated that the source of the right to refuse antipsychotic
drugs "can best be understood as substantive due process, or ... as an aspect of 'liberty'
guaranteed by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." Davis v. Hubbard,
506 F. Supp. 915, 929 (N.D. Ohio 1980); see also Riggins v. Nevada, 112 S. Ct. 1810, 1816
(1992) (holding that a pretrial detainee possesses a significant liberty interest in being free
from unwanted 'antipsychotic drugs under the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process
Clause); Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 221-22 (1990) (holding that a prison inmate
possesses a significant liberty interest in being free from unwanted antipsychotic drugs
under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment); cf Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S.
753, 759 (1985) (concluding that proposed surgical removal of a bullet from defendant for
evidentiary purposes implicated a defendant's right to privacy).
38. Bee, 744 F.2d at 1393. "[L]iberty from bodily restraint always has been recognized
as the core of the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause from arbitrary governmental
action." Id. (quoting Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 316 (1982) (citations omitted)).
39. Bee, 744 F.2d at 1393.
40. 445 U.S. 480 (1980).
41. Bee, 744 F.2d at 1393 (quoting Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 492 (1980)). Address-
ing the involuntary treatment of a mentally unstable prisoner, the Vitek Court concluded
that, "[a] criminal conviction and sentence of imprisonment ... do not authorize the State
to classify him as mentally ill and to subject him to involuntary psychiatric treatment with-
out affording him additional due process protections." Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 493-94
(1980).
42. Bee, 744 F.2d at 1393-94.
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permanently affect an individual's ability to think and communicate."43
After concluding that the pretrial detainee has a constitutional liberty
interest in avoiding antipsychotic medication, the Bee court stated that
the protected interest is not absolute, but must be weighed against com-
peting state interests." The court first noted that pretrial detainees do
not enjoy the same freedoms as unincarcerated individuals, and then ex-
amined the three interests advanced by the state.45
First, the court summarily dismissed the state's asserted concern that
the jail has the right and duty to treat a mentally ill detainee, concluding
that such a duty arises only when necessary medical treatment is desired
by the detainee. 6 Second, the court rejected the state's asserted interest
in keeping the defendant competent to stand trial, citing the state court's
earlier determination that the defendant was not mentally ill and was
competent to stand trial.47 Finally, the court addressed the state's as-
43. Id. at 1394.
44. Id.; accord Davis v. Hubbard, 506 F. Supp. 915 (N.D. Ohio 1980). The Davis court
stated:
Recognition of the interests.. . as fundamental and worthy of constitutional pro-
tection does not, ipso facto, mean that plaintiffs have a right to refuse psycho-
trophic medication. Whether any such right exists, and if so, its limitations can be
determined only after identifying the legitimate interests of the State and then
balancing these interests against the interests of the plaintiffs.
Id. at 934; see also Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 321 (1982) (stating that an involun-
tarily committed mental patient's right to freedom from bodily restraint must be balanced
against relevant state interests to determine whether his constitutionally protected right
has been violated); Rennie v. Klein, 720 F.2d 266, 273 (3d Cir. 1983) (stating that the right
of an involuntarily committed mental patient to refuse antipsychotic medication is not
absolute).
45. Bee, 744 F.2d at 1394.
46. Id. at 1394-95. The Bee court concluded that because medical treatment is re-
quired to ensure that pretrial detention does not amount to the imposition of punishment,
constitutionally mandated medical treatment does not encompass forcing the treatment on
a competent individual who chooses to forgo the risks and pains of a potentially dangerous
treatment. Id.; cf Riggins v. Nevada, 112 S. Ct. 1810, 1815 (1992) (concluding that a state
can treat a pretrial detainee with antipsychotic drugs against his will if it can demonstrate a
need for the medication and its medical appropriateness).
47. Bee, 744 F.2d at 1395. While recognizing the state's interest in bringing the ac-
cused to trial, the Bee court questioned whether such an interest would ever be compelling
enough to outweigh the criminal defendant's interest in refusing unwanted antipsychotic
medication with potentially dangerous side effects. Id. The Bee court concluded that a
state's interest that is not related to the individual's legitimate treatment needs is irrelevant
in determining whether antipsychotic medication should be involuntarily administered.
Id.; cf Riggins, 112 S. Ct. at 1815 (noting that "the State might have been able to justify
medically appropriate, involuntary treatment with [antipsychotic] drug[s] by establishing
that it could not obtain an adjudication of [the defendant's] guilt or innocence by using less
intrusive means").
Riggins v. Nevada
serted interest in protecting the jail staff and others from a violent de-
tainee.48 The court concluded that, absent an emergency, such an interest
was not "reasonably related" to the forced administration of antip-
sychotic drugs.49 To determine whether an emergency justifying medica-
tion exists, a court must balance the jail's safety concerns against the
detainee's recognized liberty interest.50 The Bee court further required
the consideration of less restrictive means and suggested segregation or
less controversial drugs, such as sedatives or tranquilizers.51
The Bee court thus concluded that the district court erred in granting
summary judgment in favor of the defendants because it had not deter-
mined whether an emergency existed to justify forcibly medicating Bee.52
The Bee court further noted that there was a genuine issue of material
fact as to whether forcible medication for an indefinite period was an
"exaggerated response" if an emergency did exist.53
Six years after the Tenth Circuit decided Bee, the United States
Supreme Court considered in Washington v. Harper4 whether a con-
victed prisoner has a liberty interest in being free from the forced admin-
istration of antipsychotic drugs under the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. 55 Harper filed suit in state court claiming that
the state prison policy allowing the involuntary administration of antip-
sychotic medication without first providing a judicial hearing violated his
rights under the Due Process, Equal Protection, and Free Speech clauses
48. Bee, 744 F.2d at 1395.
49. Id. (quoting Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 539 (1979)).
50. Id. at 1395-96. A determination of whether an "emergency" exists "requires an
evaluation in each case of all the relevant circumstances, including the nature and gravity
of the safety threat, the characteristics of the individual involved, and the likely effects of
particular drugs." Id. at 1396.
51. Id. The Bee court recognized that the Supreme Court had declined to apply a less
intrusive means test with respect to the use of physical restraints in the treatment of an
involuntarily committed mental patient. Id. at 1396 n.7. The Bee court distinguished the
case before it, however, by noting that the forced administration of antipsychotic drugs
involved mental restraints with potentially long term effects on a pretrial detainee who had
not been declared mentally incompetent, rather than the. use of temporary, physical re-
straints on an individual who had been certified as severely retarded. Id.
52. Id. at 1396.
53. Id. at 1396-97; see also Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 547-48 (1979) (stating that
courts should ordinarily defer to the expert judgment of corrections officials in matters
arising in the daily operation of a corrections facility, at least in the absence of substantial
evidence that the officials have exaggerated their response in the name of preserving inter-
nal order, discipline, and maintaining security).
54. 494 U.S. 210 (1990).
55. Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 221-22 (1990).
1994]
550 Journal of Contemporary Health Law and Policy [Vol. 10:541
of the federal and Washington state Constitutions.56 The Washington dis-
trict court held that although Harper retained a liberty interest in free-
dom from unwanted antipsychotic medication, the prison policy met the
Supreme Court's requirements of due process. 7  The Washington
Supreme Court reversed on appeal.5 ' The court agreed with the trial
court's determination that Harper possessed a liberty interest in refusing
antipsychotic medication, but further concluded that greater procedural
protections were necessary because of the "highly intrusive nature" of
antipsychotic drug treatment.59 The United States Supreme Court re-
versed on appeal.
In Harper, the Supreme Court first sought to separate the substantive
and procedural rights involved in the case, stating that procedural protec-
tions must be examined in light of the substantive rights at stake.60 The
Court determined that "the substantive issue is what factual circum-
stances must exist before the State may administer antipsychotic drugs to
the prisoner against his will."' 61 The Court concluded that although
Harper possessed a significant liberty interest in avoiding unwanted an-
tipsychotic medication under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, such a liberty interest was not absolute.62 The Court rea-
soned that the extent of Harper's rights under the Due Process Clause
must be defined in the context of the inmate's confinement. 63 The Court
stated that the proper standard of review for determining the validity of a
prison regulation that is claimed to infringe on an inmate's fundamental
constitutional right is whether the regulation is "reasonably related to le-
gitimate penological interests."'
In evaluating whether the challenged prison policy met the reasonable-
ness standard, the Supreme Court considered three factors.65 First, the
56. Id. at 217.
57. Id. at 217-18; see Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480 (1980).
58. Harper, 494 U.S. at 218.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 220.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 221-22.
63. Id. at 222.
64. Id. at 223 (quoting Tirner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987)). The Supreme Court
stated that the Washington Supreme Court had erred in refusing to apply a standard of
reasonableness. Id.; see also O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342 (1987) (holding
that the proper standard for determining the validity of a prisoner's rights is whether the
regulation claimed to infringe on an inmate's First Amendment rights is reasonable).
65. Harper, 494 U.S. at 224; see also Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987) (discussing
several factors to determine the reasonableness of a challenged prison regulation).
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Court inquired whether there was a valid, rational connection between
the regulation and the legitimate government interest advanced to justify
it.6 6 The Court concluded that the state's interest in providing appropri-
ate medical treatment and ensuring the safety of mentally ill inmates and
the prison staff were legitimate and important interests.67 The Court also
concluded that the regulation was a rational means of furthering these
objectives.6" The Court reasoned that the regulation applied exclusively
to inmates who were mentally ill or who represented a significant danger
to themselves or others, and that the drugs were administered only under
the direction of a licensed psychiatrist for the purpose of treatment.69
The two other factors the Court weighed in determining whether the
prison policy met the reasonableness standard were the availability of
reasonable alternatives and the adverse impact of accommodating the in-
mate's liberty interest on the guards, other inmates, and the allocation of
prison resources. 70 The Court recognized that "the absence of ready al-
ternatives is evidence of the reasonableness of a prison regulation," but
also stated that prison officials were not required to "set up and then
shoot down every conceivable alternative method of accommodating the
claimant's constitutional complaint.",7 1 The Court concluded that the
availability of alternative means for accommodating Harper's interest in
refusing antipsychotic medication did not invalidate the state's prison pol-
icy.72 The Court reasoned that the alternative use of physical restraints
or seclusion does not "fully accommodat[e] the prisoner's rights at de
minimis cost to valid penological interests., 73 The Court stated that
Harper failed to show that the use of physical restraints or seclusion
would constitute acceptable substitutes for antipsychotic drugs, "in terms
of either their medical effectiveness or their toll on limited prison
66. Harper, 494 U.S. at 224.
67. Id. at 225.
68. Id. at 226.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 225; see also Turner, 482 U.S. at 90.
71. Harper, 494 U.S. at 225 (quoting Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 90-91 (1987)).
72. Id. at 226.
73. Id. (quoting Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 91 (1987)). The Court also rejected
Harper's contention that the Due Process Clause mandates that a prisoner's right to refuse
antipsychotic medication be sustained unless he is found to be incompetent, and unless the
fact finder makes the substituted judgment that the prisoner would consent to the treat-
ment if competent. The Court rejected such a standard because it "takes no account of the
legitimate governmental interest in treating him where medically appropriate for the pur-
pose of reducing the danger he poses." Id.
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resources."
74
The Supreme Court stated that the prison policy at issue comported
with the demands of due process because it required the state to establish
by medical finding that the inmate was mentally ill and dangerous, and
that the treatment was in the inmate's medical interest. 75 The Court rea-
soned that because the policy required that the medication be prescribed
by a psychiatrist and then approved by a reviewing psychiatrist, the policy
ensured that the treatment was in the inmate's medical interest, given the
legitimate needs of his institutional confinement. 76 The Court concluded
that under these conditions the state could forcibly administer unwanted
antipsychotic drugs to a mentally ill inmate without denying the inmate
due process.77
Justices Stevens, Brennan, and Marshall disagreed with the majority's
evaluation of the liberty interest at stake in Harper. They argued that the
intrusiveness of antipsychotic drugs was properly equated with elec-
troconvulsive therapy or psychosurgery, and that a competent individ-
ual's right to refuse such medication was "a fundamental liberty interest
deserving the highest order of protection., 78
II. RIGGLVS V. NEVADA
In 1992, the United States Supreme Court held that a pretrial detainee
has a constitutionally protected right to refuse unwanted antipsychotic
medication.79 In Riggins v. Nevada, the Court held that for a state to
medicate a criminal defendant prior to and during trial without violating
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the state must
demonstrate the need for the antipsychotic drug and its medical appropri-
ateness.8 0 Because Nevada did not demonstrate a need to medicate the
defendant Riggins, the Supreme Court concluded that the forced admin-
istration of antipsychotic drugs violated both Riggins' constitutionally
protected liberty interest in freedom from antipsychotic drugs and his
Sixth Amendment right to assist in his own defense."1
74. Id. at 227.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 240-41 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
79. Riggins v. Nevada, 112 S. Ct. 1810, 1814-15 (1992).
80. Id. at 1815.
81. Id. at 1814-16.
Riggins v. Nevada
A. Case History
Shortly after his arrest for robbery and murder in late November 1987,
a private psychiatrist who treated prisoners at the jail put Riggins on the
antipsychotic drug Mellaril. s2 The drug was prescribed because the de-
fendant complained of hearing voices in his head and of having difficulty
sleeping.8 3 Riggins told the psychiatrist he had been treated successfully
with Mellaril in the past, but that he had not been taking any prescription
medication at the time he committed the murder.84 The dosages of Mel-
laril that Riggins received were subsequently increased in December
1987, and January, May, and July 1988, in response to his continued com-
plaints of hearing voices and insomnia.85 Three psychiatrists examined
Riggins in February and March 1988, and two found him competent to
stand trial.86 However, Riggins was receiving 450 milligrams of Mellaril
per day at the time of the examinations.87
In June 1988, defense counsel filed a motion to terminate Riggins'
medication until the end of his trial."8 Defense counsel argued that con-
tinued involuntary medication infringed upon Riggins' freedom, and that
the effect of the drugs on his demeanor and mental state during trial
would deny him Due Process under the Fourteenth Amendment. 89 The
State opposed the motion, arguing that the medication was necessary to
ensure Riggins' competency to stand trial.90
In July 1988, the Clark County district court held an evidentiary hear-
ing on the motion.9' The testimony of the three psychiatrists who had
examined Riggins earlier was inconsistent. Dr. Master, who had earlier
concluded that Riggins was competent to stand trial, "guess[ed]" that ces-
sation of the medication would not result in a noticeable change in behav-
ior or render the defendant incompetent to stand trial.92 Dr. Quass, who
initially treated Riggins with Mellaril following his arrest, stated that Rig-
82. Id. at 1812. Riggins initially consented to taking the Mellaril. Brief of the Ameri-
can Psychiatric Association, supra note 3, at 3.
83. Riggins, 112 S. Ct. at 1812.
84. Brief of the American Psychiatric Association, supra note 3, at 3.
85. See Riggins v. State, 808 P.2d 535,537 (Nev. 1991), rev'd, Riggins v. Nevada, 112 S.
Ct. 1810 (1992).
86. Riggins, 112 S. Ct. at 1812.
87. Id.
88. Id. At the same time, defense counsel gave notice of a defense of insanity. Brief of
the American Psychiatric Association, supra note 3, at 4.
89. Riggins, 112 S. Ct. at 1812.
90. Id. at 1813.
91. Id.
92. Id.
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gins would be competent to stand trial without the medication, but that
the effects of the drug would not be noticeable to jurors if medication was
continued.93
Dr. O'Gorman, who had treated Riggins several years before the crime
and who had found him competent for the purpose of standing trial in the
instant case, testified that he believed "Mellaril made the defendant
calmer and more relaxed but that an excessive dose would cause drowsi-
ness."94 Dr. O'Gorman also questioned the need for the high dosage and
testified that he was unable to predict how Riggins might behave if the
medication was terminated. 95 The written report of Dr. Jurasky, who had
concluded that the defendant was incompetent to stand trial, was also
before the court.9 6 In that report, Dr. Jurasky stated that he believed
Riggins "would most likely regress to a manifest psychosis and become
extremely difficult to manage" if the administration of Mellaril was
discontinued.97
Without specifically finding that antipsychotic medication was neces-
sary, the district court denied defense counsel's motion to suspend medi-
cation until the end of trial.98 Thus, Riggins continued to receive 800
milligrams of Mellaril daily until the end of his trial.99 At trial, Riggins
presented a defense of insanity."° Testifying on his own behalf, Riggins
stated that he had fought with the murder victim, but that the victim was
trying to kill him, and "voices in his head said that killing [the victim]
would be justifiable homicide."'1 ' The same jury convicted Riggins and
sentenced him to death on the murder charge.'0 2
Riggins appealed his conviction to the Nevada Supreme Court. He ar-
gued that the antipsychotic medication forced on him during trial denied
him the ability to assist in his own defense and "prejudicially affected his
attitude, appearance, and demeanor at trial." ' 3 Riggins argued that the
state violated his constitutionally protected liberty interest in being free
from unwanted antipsychotic drugs by forcibly medicating him with an-
93. Riggins, 112 S. Ct. at 1813.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Riggins, 112 S. Ct. at 1813.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Riggins, 112 S. Ct. at 1813.
102. Id.
103. Id.
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tipsychotic drugs without demonstrating the need for the drug or the un-
availability of less drastic alternatives.1 4
The Nevada Supreme Court affirmed both the conviction and sen-
tence. °5 While it recognized that Riggins' demeanor had probative value
where sanity was at issue, the court concluded that ample expert testi-
mony was presented at trial to inform the jury about the effect of the
medication on the defendant, and that expert testimony was a sufficient
substitute for the jury's firsthand observation of the defendant's natural
demeanor.10 6 The Nevada Supreme Court thus held that the denial of
defendant's motion to terminate medication was neither an abuse of dis-
cretion nor a violation of Riggins' trial rights.107
In a concurring opinion, Justice Rose indicated he would have pre-
ferred "a stronger showing that the medication was absolutely necessary,
and evidence establishing how the defendant behaved without it."'1 8 In a
dissenting opinion, Justice Springer stated, "I do not think that these
drugs should be forced down the throats of these defendants, thereby in-
ducing an unnatural and unwanted state of consciousness, just so the state
can bring them to 'justice."" 0 9 Justice Springer maintained that the
forced administration of antipsychotic medication deprived Riggins of his
rights to appear, defend, and present evidence at trial." 0
104. Id.
105. Riggins, 112 S. Ct. at 1813.
106. Id. at 1813-14. The issue of whether forced medication during trial violates a de-
fendant's trial rights was one of first impression for the Nevada Supreme Court. Riggins v.
State, 808 P.2d 535, 537 (Nev. 1991), rev'd, Riggins v. Nevada, 112 S. Ct. 1810 (1992).
According to the Nevada Supreme Court, the "states are evenly divided over whether
expert testimony about the effect of the medication can substitute for the jury's firsthand
observation of the defendant's natural demeanor." Id.; see, e.g., Commonwealth v.
Louraine, 453 N.E.2d 437, 442 (Mass. 1983) (upholding the defendant's right to be tried in
an unmedicated state and concluding expert testimony may not substitute for firsthand
observation of the defendant's natural demeanor); State v. Law, 244 S.E.2d 302, 307 (S.C.
1978) (determining that the trial court had safeguarded the defendant from prejudice with
respect to his medicated appearance at trial by informing that the defendant was taking
antipsychotic drugs through expert testimony).
107. Riggins, 112 S. Ct. at 1814. The Nevada Supreme Court did not examine whether
the medication was needed to maintain Riggins' competency or whether the state had a
sufficient justification for administering the medication. Brief of the American Psychiatric
Association, supra note 3, at 5. Cf Riggins v. State, 808 P.2d at 540 (Rose, J., concurring)
(stating that the defendant should not be involuntarily medicated during trial unless it is
truly necessary, and suggesting a suspension of the antipsychotic medication and observa-
tion of the defendant's behavior while unmedicated to make such a determination).
108. Riggins v. State, 808 P.2d at 540 (Rose, J., concurring).
109. Id. at 541 (Springer, J., dissenting).
110. Id. at 542.
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B. The Lower Courts' Error
The United States Supreme Court in Riggins concluded that the Clark
County, Nevada district court's refusal to acknowledge Riggins' liberty
interest in freedom from unwanted antipsychotic drugs constituted re-
versible error because the defendant's constitutionally protected trial
rights may have been impaired."1 In particular, the Court pointed out
that under the high dosage of Mellaril that Riggins was receiving, there
was the possibility that the defendant might suffer from drowsiness or
confusion, and that such side effects could have impacted Riggins' out-
ward appearance, the content of his testimony on the witness stand, his
ability to follow the proceedings, or the substance of his communication
to counsel.1 12 The Court also rejected the dissenting Justice Thomas' sug-
gestion that the defendant be required to demonstrate actual trial preju-
dice as a result of the continued administration of Mellaril." 3
The Supreme Court characterized the Clark County district court's or-
der denying Riggins' pretrial motion to suspend medication as "la-
conic." 4 The order did not adopt the State's view that the
administration of Mellaril was required to ensure that defendant could be
tried, nor did it indicate a finding that safety considerations or other com-
pelling concerns outweighed Riggins' interest in freedom from unwanted
antipsychotic drugs. 5, The Court stated that the district court's determi-
nation was deficient because it "allowed administration of Mellaril to
continue without making any determination of the need for this course or
any findings about reasonable alternatives.""' 6 The Supreme Court
stated:
Were we to divine the District Court's logic from the hearing
transcript, we would have to conclude that the court simply
weighed the risk that the defense would be prejudiced by
changes in Riggins' outward appearance against the chance that
Riggins would become incompetent if taken off Mellaril, and
struck the balance in favor of involuntary medication.'
1 7
111. Riggins, 112 S. Ct. at 1816.
112. Id.
113. Id.; cf Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 504-05 (1976) (discussing the prejudicial
effect of defendant's appearance at trial in prison clothing); Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337,
344 (1970) (discussing the likely prejudicial effect of defendant's appearance at trial bound
and gagged).
114. Riggins, 112 S. Ct. at 1816.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 1815-16.
117. Id. at 1816.
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The Supreme Court also rejected the Nevada Supreme Court's conclu-
sion that expert testimony about the effect of antipsychotic drugs on the
demeanor of the defendant could cure the possibility that defendant's tes-
timony, interaction with counsel, or comprehension at trial were compro-
mised by the forced administration of the drugs. 18 The Court further
concluded that such an unacceptable risk of prejudice at trial could not be
justified by an essential state interest because there were no findings in
the record to support a conclusion that the medication was necessary to
accomplish an essential state policy." 9
C. The Supreme Court's Two Prong Test
The Supreme Court applied a two prong inquiry regarding the constitu-
tionality of forcibly medicating Riggins with antipsychotics: whether a
"need" for antipsychotic medication had been demonstrated, and
whether the administration of the drugs was medically appropriate.
120
The Court presumed that administration of the antipsychotic drug Mel-
laril was medically appropriate in Riggins' case, and thus the Court's con-
clusion regarding the first prong was not a decisive factor in its decision to
reverse the Supreme Court of Nevada.' 2 '
The Supreme Court relied on its decision in Washington v. Harper in
addressing Riggins' argument that involuntary administration of Mellaril
had denied him a full and fair trial.122 Noting that the Harper Court held
that a convicted prisoner's interest in avoiding unwanted antipsychotic
drugs is protected under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment because it "represents a substantial interference with that
person's liberty," the Riggins Court concluded that a criminal defendant
has a protected right to refuse antipsychotic medication.' 23 Citing the
118. Id. But see Riggins v. State, 808 P.2d 535, 538 (Nev. 1991), rev'd, Riggins v. Ne-
vada, 112 S. Ct. 1810 (1992) (holding that expert testimony was sufficient to inform the jury
of the effect of the antipsychotic medication on defendant's demeanor and testimony); see
also State v. Law, 244 S.E.2d. 302, 307 (S.C. 1978) (noting that the trial court had safe-
guarded the defendant from prejudice with respect to his appearance at trial by informing
the jury that defendant was taking antipsychotic drugs).
119. Riggins, 112 S. Ct. at 1816-17, cf. Holbrook v. Flynn, 475 U.S. 560, 568-69 (1986)
(holding that trial prejudice resulting from the noticeable presence of guards at respon-
dent's trial was not so inherently prejudicial as to deny respondent his constitutional right
to a fair trial because sufficient cause for their presence could be found in the State's
legitimate interest in maintaining custody over defendant).
120. Riggins, 112 S. Ct. at 1815.
121. Id. at 1814.
122. Id.
123. Id. (quoting Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 229 (1990)).
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many negative physical and mental side effects of these drugs, the Court
further noted that "[i]n the case of antipsychotic drugs like Mellaril, that
interference is particularly severe. '"124
The Supreme Court characterized Harper as requiring "a finding of
overriding justification and a determination of medical appropriate-
ness."' 25 In Harper, this standard was met where there was a determina-
tion that, "the inmate is dangerous to himself or others and the treatment
is in the inmate's medical interest.", 2 6 The Court in Riggins determined
that the Fourteenth Amendment affords pretrial detainees at least as
much protection as convicted prisoners.'27 Thus, the Court concluded
that in order to satisfy due process, a state must demonstrate a need for
the antipsychotic medication and the medical appropriateness of the drug
in order to forcibly medicate a pretrial detainee with antipsychotic
drugs. 28
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Thomas argued that while the major-
ity in Riggins purported to rely on Harper, the standards it applied dif-
fered in several respects.' 29 Justice Thomas stated that the majority
''appears to adopt a standard of strict scrutiny," contrary to the standard
of reasonableness adopted in Harper.30 Justice Thomas concluded that
the majority had departed from the standard announced in Harper by
requiring a finding that continued medication was necesssary for the de-
fendant to stand trial, or a finding that other compelling concerns out-
weighed the defendant's liberty interest. 3 '
Justice Thomas also argued that Harper did not require the considera-
124. Id. at 1814-15. See generally supra notes 18-32 and accompanying text (discussing
the negative side effects of antipsychotic drugs).
125. Riggins, 112 S. Ct. at 1815.
126. Id. (quoting Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 227 (1990)).
127. Riggins, 112 S. Ct. at 1815; see also Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 545 (1979) (stat-
ing that pretrial detainees who have not been convicted of any criminal offense retain at a
minimum the constitutional rights held by convicted prisoners).
128. Riggins, 112 S. Ct. at 1815.
129. Id. at 1826. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
130. Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting); Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 224 (1990) (ap-
plying a standard of reasonableness for determining the validity of a prison regulation
claimed to infringe on an inmate's constitutional rights).
131. Riggins, 112 S. Ct. at 1826 (Thomas, J., dissenting). The Riggins majority stated:
The [Clark County district] court's laconic order denying Riggins' motion did not
adopt the State's view, which was that continued administration of Mellaril was
required to ensure that the defendant could be tried . . . .Nor did the order
indicate a finding that safety considerations or other compelling concerns out-
weighed Riggins' interest in freedom from unwanted antipsychotic drugs.
Id. at 1816.
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tion of less intrusive alternatives, stating, "In Harper... we imposed no
such requirement."' 32 Thus, Justice Thomas concluded: "Either the
Court is seeking to change the Harper standards or it is adopting different
standards for detainees without stating its reasons. I cannot accept either
interpretation of the Court's opinion.'
133
The majority in Riggins expressly denied Justice Thomas' assertion that
it was adopting a standard of strict scrutiny for judging forced administra-
tion of antipsychotic drugs in the trial or pretrial setting, stating "[w]e
have no occasion to finally prescribe such substantive standards.' 34 The
majority did conclude, however, that "if the prosecution had demon-
strated and the [Clark County] District Court had found that treatment
with antipsychotic medication was medically appropriate and, considering
less intrusive alternatives, essential for the sake of [the defendant's] own
safety or the safety of others," then Nevada "certainly would have satis-
fied due process.
'
,1 31
The Court also maintained that a state might be able to justify the need
for antipsychotic drugs by showing that an adjudication of the defend-
ant's guilt or innocence by less intrusive means was unattainable. 36 The
Court insisted that "[tihe question whether a competent criminal defend-
ant may refuse antipsychotic medication if cessation of medication would
render him incompetent at trial is not before us.' 137 The Court declined
to consider this question because during the hearing on his motion to
suspend medication, Riggins did not contend that he had a right to be
tried without Mellaril if its discontinuation made him incompetent. 38
132. Id. at 1826 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
133. Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
134. Id. at 1815. The Court determined that it did not need to adopt any standard at all
because the district court did not make any determination of the need for continued antip-
sychotic medication or any finding about reasonable alternatives. Id. at 1815-16.
135. Id. at 1815; cf Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979) (stating that due process
allows civil commitment of an individual shown to be mentally ill and dangerous by clear
and convincing evidence).
136. Riggins, 112 S. Ct. at 1815. See Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 347 (1970) (Brennan,
J., concurring) (stating that the "constitutional power to bring an accused to trial is funda-
mental to a scheme of 'ordered liberty' and prerequisite to social justice and peace").
137. Riggins, 112 S. Ct. at 1815; see also Brief for Petitioner, Riggins v. Nevada, 112 S.
Ct. 1810 (1992) (No. 90-8466) (arguing that this case is not about whether a state may ever
treat an incompetent defendant with antipsychotic drugs in order to achieve and maintain
competency to stand trial).
138. Riggins, 112 S. Ct. at 1815.
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D. Justice Kennedy's Concurrence
Justice Kennedy concurred in the judgment but filed a separate opinion
to express his views on the issue of competency to stand trial.'39 Justice
Kennedy, who authored the majority opinion in Harper, disagreed with
the Riggins majority's application of the same standard announced in
Harper, because "[h]ere the purpose of the medication is not merely to
treat a person with grave psychiatric disorders and enable that person to
function and behave in a way not dangerous to himself and others, but
rather to render the person competent to stand trial."' 4 °
Justice Kennedy agreed with the majority that a state "has a legitimate
interest in attempting to restore the competence of otherwise incompe-
tent defendants."'' He concluded that this interest is based upon a
state's right to bring an accused to trial and upon the Supreme Court's
holding in Pate v. Robinson, 42 that conviction of an incompetent defend-
ant violates due process. 143 Justice Kennedy framed the issue in Riggins
as "whether the State's interest in conducting the trial allows it to insure
the defendant's competence by involuntary medication, assuming of
course there is a sound medical basis for the treatment.' 44 He argued
that "elementary protections against state intrusion require the State in
every case to make a showing that there is no significant risk that the
medication will impair or alter in any material way the defendant's capac-
ity or willingness to react to the testimony at trial or to assist his coun-
sel. '' 141 Justice Kennedy expressed grave doubt that such a showing could
be made.1 4
6
To justify the application of such a strict standard, Justice Kennedy dis-
139. Id. at 1817 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
140. Id. at 1818.
141. Id. at 1817.
142. 383 U.S. 375 (1966).
143. Riggins, 112 S. Ct. at 1817 (Kennedy, J., concurring); see also Drope v. Missouri,
420 U.S. 162, 171 (1975) (stating that a state cannot try an incompetent defendant); Pate v.
Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 378 (1966) (stating that a state cannot try an incompetent
defendant).
144. Riggins, 112 S. Ct. at 1818 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
145. Id.; see also Bachand, supra note 6, at 1078-79 (stating that courts should deter-
mine whether a defendant medicated with antipsychotics is suffering from any adverse side
effects and should consider the extent to which those adverse side effects may impair a
defendant's ability to present an effective defense).
146. Riggins, 112 S. Ct. at 1818 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Justice Kennedy concluded
that such an inquiry is elusive because it assumes some "baseline of normality that experts
may have some difficulty in establishing for a particular defendant, if they can establish it
at all." Id.
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cussed at great length the adverse effects of antipsychotic drugs and the
potential for prejudice to the accused.147 He stated that the drugs can
prejudice the accused by altering his demeanor in a manner that will prej-
udice his reactions and presentation in the courtroom, and by rendering
him unable or unwilling to assist counsel.' 48 He concluded that until
more effective antipsychotic drugs with minimal side effects are devel-
oped, these drugs can only be used if the state can show that involuntary
treatment does not cause alterations in the defendant that raise the above
concerns regarding trial prejudice. 149 However, because he doubted that
such a showing could be made, Justice Kennedy also stated: "If the State
cannot render the defendant competent without involuntary medication,
then it must resort to civil commitment, if appropriate, unless the defend-
ant becomes competent through other means."' 150
IV. CONCLUSION
In Riggins v. Nevada, the Supreme Court concluded that to forcibly
medicate a criminal defendant during trial, a state must establish the need
for antipsychotic medication and the drug's medical appropriateness.
The medical appropriateness prong of the Court's test was not at issue in
Riggins because the defendant never claimed that antipsychotic drug
treatment was improper. Likewise, the Court avoided setting substantive
standards regarding a state's burden to show a need for forced medica-
tion. The opinions, however, do offer guidance on this issue.
First, Justice Kennedy chose to set the substantive standards that the
majority opinion declined to expound. Justice Kennedy clearly believed
that the issue of competency should be addressed, and, rather than apply-
ing the reasonableness test for forcibly medicated inmates that he formu-
lated in Harper, he would have required that a state demonstrate that the
medication would not affect the defendant's behavior and demeanor in a
substantial way. If the state cannot meet this burden, Justice Kennedy
suggested civil commitment. With only Justices Thomas and Scalia dis-
147. Id. at 1818-19 (Kennedy, J., concurring); see also Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S.
210, 229-30 (1990) (discussing the adverse side effects of antipsychotic drugs); Brief of the
American Psychiatric Association, supra note 3, at 10 (stating that "antipsychotic medica-
tion can cause a number of side-effects that are readily observable and therefore may af-
fect a jury's view of a medicated defendant").
148. Riggins, 112 S. Ct. at 1818-19 (Kennedy, J., concurring); see generally Geders v.
United States, 425 U.S. 80, 91 (1976) (holding that a defendant's right to the effective
assistance of counsel is impaired when he is unable to actively cooperate with his attorney).
149. Riggins, 112 S. Ct. at 1820 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
150. Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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senting, Justice Kennedy's views on the use of antipsychotic drugs to en-
sure a criminal defendant's competency to stand trial may represent the
views of a majority of the Court.
Second, while the majority declined to rule on whether a competent
criminal defendant may refuse antipsychotic medication if cessation of
medication would render him incompetent to stand trial, the court was
not silent on the issue. In its discussion of how a state might establish the
need for antipsychotic drugs to justify involuntary medication, the major-
ity suggested that a state might be able to forcibly medicate a defendant
with antipsychotic drugs if the state can show that it cannot bring the
defendant to trial using less intrusive means. This suggests that a state
must take steps before trial to ensure that the defendant would not be
competent without the medication, such as determining competency
before the medication is given. If medication is necessary to ensure com-
petency, the state would be well advised to determine that an unnecessa-
rily high dosage is not administered. Finally, the defendant should be
monitored for adverse side effects due to antipsychotic drug treatment. If
the physical or mental side effects are pronounced, the state should dis-
continue treatment and seek civil commitment.
Elizabeth A. Schmidtlein
